Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments
This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents' incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to implement the first-best effort, and then offer two distinct incentive schemes, fast track and late selection, to circumvent this problem. The present model offers a mechanism through which these two schemes arise in a unified framework.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047|
Web page: http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/index-e.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437 Elsevier.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Hideo Owan, 2004. "Promotion, Turnover, Earnings, and Firm-Sponsored Training," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(4), pages 955-978, October.
- Kong-Pin Chen, 2005.
"External Recruitment as an Incentive Device,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 259-278, April.
- Kong-Pin Chen, 2004. "External Recruitment as an incentive Device," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 54, Econometric Society.
- Kong-Pin Chen, 2004. "External Recruitment as an Incentive Device," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 514, Econometric Society.
- Hodaka Morita, 2002.
"Multiskilling, Delegation, and Continuous Process Improvement: A Comparative Analysis of U.S.-Japanese Work Organizations,"
Labor and Demography
- Hodaka Morita, 2005. "Multi-skilling, Delegation and Continuous Process Improvement: A Comparative Analysis of US-Japanese Work Organizations," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(285), pages 69-93, 02.
- Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
- Michael Waldman, 1983.
"Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
286, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Optimal Promotion Policies with the Looking-Glass Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(4), pages 857-878, October.
- Ariga,Kenn & Brunello,Giorgio & Ohkusa,Yasushi, 2010.
"Internal Labour Markets in Japan,"
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521142748, November.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
- Meyer, Margaret A, 1992. "Biased Contests and Moral Hazard: Implications for Career Profiles," CEPR Discussion Papers 637, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Waldman, 2003. "Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 27-41, January.
- Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-70, October.
- Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie & Julie Valentin, 1999. "Early Starters versus Late Beginners," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 731-760, August.
- Michael Kremer, 1993. "The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 551-575.
- Ishiguro, Shingo, 2004. "Collusion and discrimination in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 357-369, June.
- Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1999. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1321-1358.
- Naoto Osawa & Kazushige Kamiyama & Koji Nakamura & Tomohiro Noguchi & Eiji Maeda, 2002. "An Examination of Structural Changes in Employment and Wages in Japan," Bank of Japan Research Papers 2002-08-02, Bank of Japan.
- MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1988.
"Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 832-54, August.
- Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1985. "Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment," Working Papers 628, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Ishida, Junichiro, 2004. "Signaling and strategically delayed promotion," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(6), pages 687-700, December.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December.
- Dan Bernhardt, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 315-339.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0838. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fumiko Matsumoto)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.