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Punishment for sabotage in dynamic tournaments

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  • Klunover, Doron

Abstract

Punishment is incorporated into Gürtler and Münster (2010) two-round three-player tournament with both productive and sabotage effort by allowing the organizer to punish only one saboteur and only in one round. Two efficiency criteria are considered and it is found that even if in round 1 the organizer could punish more than one player, she should still choose to punish in round 2. This suggests that a principal with limited authority should be patient and ignore sabotage when carried out by workers in the early stages of their career but punish them if they are close to promotion.

Suggested Citation

  • Klunover, Doron, 2023. "Punishment for sabotage in dynamic tournaments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:106:y:2023:i:c:s0304406823000344
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102841
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oliver Gürtler & Johannes Münster & Petra Nieken, 2013. "Information Policy in Tournaments with Sabotage," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(3), pages 932-966, July.
    2. Gürtler, Oliver & Münster, Johannes, 2010. "Sabotage in dynamic tournaments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 179-190, March.
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    8. Klunover, Doron, 2021. "When sabotage fails," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 164-168.
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