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Don't hate the player, hate the game: Uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests

Author

Listed:
  • Glenn Dutcher
  • Daniela Glätzle-Rützler
  • Dmitry Ryvkin

Abstract

Contests are meant to attract the best performers and incentivize high effort, however, they may also attract cheaters who try to win via illicit means which crowds out the best performers. We use a laboratory experiment to explore the role of self-selection in contests with a possibility of lying in a real effort task. Contrary to common wisdom, we do not find evidence that contests disproportionately attract intrinsic cheaters. However, we find that contests fail at selecting the best performers, as no difference is observed in the actual or perceived ability of those who selected into the contest versus those who selected into a comparable noncompetitive pay scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • Glenn Dutcher & Daniela Glätzle-Rützler & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2016. "Don't hate the player, hate the game: Uncovering the foundations of cheating in contests," Working Papers 2016-29, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    • Handle: RePEc:inn:wpaper:2016-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Nick Feltovich, 2019. "The interaction between competition and unethical behaviour," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(1), pages 101-130, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contest; cheating; entry; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General

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