Signaling and strategically delayed promotion
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Dan Bernhardt, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 315-339.
- Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
- Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.
- George Baker & Michael Gibbs & Bengt Holmstrom, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919.
- Mincer, Jacob & Higuchi, Yoshio, 1988. "Wage structures and labor turnover in the United States and Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 97-133, June.
- Morita, Hodaka, 2001. "Choice of Technology and Labour Market Consequences: An Explanation of U.S.-Japanese Differences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 29-50, January.
- Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437 Elsevier.
- Prendergast, Canice, 1992. "Career development and specific human capital collection," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 207-227, September.
- Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-466, March.
- Chun Chang & Wang, Yijiang, 1995. "A framework for understanding differences in labor turnover and human capital investment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 91-105, September.
- Ariga,Kenn & Brunello,Giorgio & Ohkusa,Yasushi, 2010. "Internal Labour Markets in Japan," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521142748, April.
- Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-519, July.
- Ariga,Kenn & Brunello,Giorgio & Ohkusa,Yasushi, 2000. "Internal Labour Markets in Japan," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521642408, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2004:i:8:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Waldman, Michael, 2016. "The dual avenues of labor market signaling," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 120-134.
- Timothy J. Perri, 2005. "Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market," Working Papers 05-21, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
- Kato, Takao & Ogawa, Hiromasa & Owan, Hideo, 2016. "Working Hours, Promotion and the Gender Gap in the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 10454, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Junichiro Ishida, 2012.
"Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(3), pages 627-655.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments," OSIPP Discussion Paper 06E001, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Dynamically Sabotage-Proof Tournaments," ISER Discussion Paper 0838, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2004. "Education as advertisement," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(8), pages 1-8.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2012. "Promotion without Commitment: Signaling, Time Inconsistency and Decentralization of the Firm," ISER Discussion Paper 0843, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Kazuaki Okamura, 2011. "The Signalling Role of Promotion in Japan," Discussion Papers 1112, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
- Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012.
"The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91-147.
- DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 1550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:11:y:2004:i:6:p:687-700. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.