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Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market

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  • Timothy J. Perri

Abstract

Publications signal a professor’s productivity and may lead to raids by other universities. A raided professor learns the value of non-wage benefits at a raiding university, and will quit only if benefits elsewhere are relatively high. The social value of these benefits suggests research may be efficient even in the absence of a direct social value from research. Other results are: in some cases, a school may preempt signaling by paying a higher wage, but it will only do so when signaling is inefficient; and it is inefficient for a university to commit to not match outside offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy J. Perri, 2005. "Raiding and Signaling in the Academic Labor Market," Working Papers 05-21, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:05-21
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    File URL: http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp0521.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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