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Professional Cycling and the Fight against Doping

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  • Volker Robeck

    (University of Marburg)

Abstract

Doping seems to be well-organized and inherent in the system of professional cycling. This paper provides a theoretical approach, by using a multi-task (training and doping) principal-agent (team manager and cyclist) model, to illustrate the information asymmetry and conflicting objectives between both actors. Three settings are used to represent different situations in which the fight against doping takes place with varying intensity. The comparison of the equilibria in eachsetting reveals the influence of the fight against doping on the team members’ behaviour. The analysis shows that team managers are interested in doping, and that current anti-doping institutions cannot suppress the abuse of forbidden drugs.

Suggested Citation

  • Volker Robeck, 2014. "Professional Cycling and the Fight against Doping," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201456, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  • Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201456
    as

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    File URL: https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/56-2014_robeck.pdf
    File Function: First 201456
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
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    8. Nicolas EBER & Jacques THÉPOT, 1999. "Doping in Sport and Competition Design," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1999044, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
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    12. Alexander Dilger & Bernd Frick & Frank Tolsdorf, 2007. "Are Athletes Doped? Some Theoretical Arguments And Empirical Evidence," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 604-615, October.
    13. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
    14. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002. "The economics of doping," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 109-127, March.
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    17. Evelyn Korn & Volker Robeck, 2013. "The role of sports physicians in doping: a note on incentives," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201317, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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