Doping in Sport and Competition Design
We develop a game-theoretic model of doping which focuses on the economic aspects of competitive sports. According to the model, incentives for athletes to use doping increase when (i) the efficiency of the drug test system is low, (ii) the number of competitions during one season is high, (iii) the spread of prizes from sports events is large, (iv) the perceived health cost is low. Implication for anti-doping policy are derived. We also discuss the optimal (anti-doping) competition design.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 1999|
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