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Fraudulent Accounting and Other Doping Games

  • Aleksander Berentsen
  • Yvan Lengwiler

From a game theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to embellish the financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhance performance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dynamics of both applications within the same model. We allow for heterogenous populations, such as highly talented versus more mediocre athletes, or high quality managers versus less able colleagues. Interestingly, for some parameters, the replicator dynamics is characterized by cycles. Thus, we may see cycles of doping and clean sport, and cycles of fraudulent and honest accounting. Moreover, in some cases, high ability players are more likely to commit fraud than low ability types.

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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 175.

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Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:175
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  1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
  2. Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Brügger & Simon Lörtscher, . "On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing," IEW - Working Papers 153, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  3. Berentsen, Aleksander, 2002. "The Economics of doping," MPRA Paper 37322, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
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