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Heterogeneity, Local Information, and Global Interaction

Author

Listed:
  • Aleksander Berentsen
  • Esther Bruegger
  • Simon Loertscher

Abstract

Consider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with heterogenous agents who can either play fair or cheat. We model heterogeneity by assuming that the players are either high or low types. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of the model: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular we find that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents are maximally segregated.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, "undated". "Heterogeneity, Local Information, and Global Interaction," IEW - Working Papers 182, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:182
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    File URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52078/1/iewwp182.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Bruno Frey, 2005. "‘‘Just forget it.’’ Memory distortions as bounded rationality," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 4(1), pages 13-25, June.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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