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Hálózati kísérletek
[Network experiments]

  • Takács, Károly


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    A társadalmi kapcsolatok hálózatának elemzése akárcsak a kísérleti közgazdaságtan, az utóbbi évtizedben rohamosan fejlődő diszciplína, amely számos új tudományos eredménnyel gazdagította és gazdagítja a társadalmi és gazdasági jelenségek magyarázatait. A hálózati kísérletek a két diszciplína találkozási pontján különösen tanulságosak, hiszen nem pusztán a hálózati iparágak működését és problémáit segítenek megérteni és megmagyarázni, de eredményeik meghatározó jelentőségűek a fogyasztói döntéshozatal vizsgálatában és a piaci verseny szabályozásának szempontjából is. A jelen tanulmány áttekintést ad a hálózati kísérletekről, ezen belül a lokális interakciós játékokról, a strukturálisan beágyazott játékokról, a cserehálózatok irodalmáról és a hálózatformálódási játékokról, valamint bemutatja a legfontosabb eredmények gyakorlati alkalmazási lehetőségeit és az alkalmazhatóság korlátait. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: C71, C91, C92, D03, D85.

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    Article provided by Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation) in its journal Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

    Volume (Year): LVII (2010)
    Issue (Month): 11 ()
    Pages: 958-979

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    Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1201
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    Order Information: Postal: Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation) Budapest, Budaörsi út 45., 1112, Hungary
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