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Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation: An Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Britta Hoyer

    (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Paderborn University, 33098 Paderborn, Germany)

  • Stephanie Rosenkranz

    (School of Economics, Utrecht University, 3584 EC Utrecht, The Netherlands)

Abstract

Theoretical models on network formation focus mostly on the stability and efficiency of equilibria, but they cannot deliver an understanding of why specific equilibrium networks are selected or whether they are all actually reachable from any starting network. To study factors affecting equilibrium selection, we designed a network formation experiment with multiple equilibria, which can be categorized in terms of the demand on players’ farsightedness and robustness to errors. In a second scenario, we increase the need for farsighted behavior by players, as well as the perceived riskiness of equilibria by adding a stage in which the network is disrupted. This setting allows us to analyze the interplay between the need for farsightedness and perceived risk of errors and its effect on network formation and equilibrium selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Britta Hoyer & Stephanie Rosenkranz, 2018. "Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation: An Experiment," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-25, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:9:y:2018:i:4:p:89-:d:180259
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Woods & Mustafa Abdallah & Saurabh Bagchi & Shreyas Sundaram & Timothy Cason, 2022. "Network defense and behavioral biases: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 254-286, February.
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    3. Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2023. "Network disruption and the common-enemy effect," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 117-155, March.
    4. Djawadi, Behnud Mir & Endres, Angelika & Hoyer, Britta & Recker, Sonja, 2019. "Network formation and disruption - An experiment are equilibrium networks too complex?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 708-734.

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