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Strategic Network Disruption and Defense


  • K.J.M. De Jaegher
  • B. Hoyer


Networks are one of the essential building blocks of society. Not only do firms cooperate in R&D networks, but firms themselves may be seen as networks of information-exchanging workers. Social movements increasingly make use of networks to exchange information, just as on the negative side criminal and terrorist networks use them. However, the literature on networks has mainly focused on the cooperative side of networks and has so far neglected the competition side of networks. Networks themselves may face competition from actors with opposing interests to theirs. Several R&D networks may compete with one another. The firm as a network of employees obviously faces competition. In particular, given the importance of connectivity for networks, competing networks may try to disrupt each other, by trying to convince key players in competing networks to defect, or to stop sponsoring key links (strategic network disruption). In response, networks that face competition will adapt their structure, and will avoid vulnerable network structures. Such network competition is what our paper is concerned with.

Suggested Citation

  • K.J.M. De Jaegher & B. Hoyer, 2010. "Strategic Network Disruption and Defense," Working Papers 10-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:use:tkiwps:1013

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Marco J. van der Leij, 2003. "Competing Transport Networks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-009/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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    Cited by:

    1. B. Hoyer, 2012. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
    2. Bravard, Christophe & Charroin, Liza & Touati, Corinne, 2017. "Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 62-79.
    3. Hans Haller, 2015. "Network Vulnerability: A Designer-Disruptor Game," Working Papers e07-50, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
    4. McBride, Michael & Hewitt, David, 2013. "The enemy you can’t see: An investigation of the disruption of dark networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 32-50.
    5. Tackseung Jun & Jeong-Yoo Kim, 2020. "A Note on Connectivity and Stability in Dynamic Network Formation," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 11(4), pages 1-1, October.
    6. V. Masson & S. Choi & A. Moore & M. Oak, 2018. "A model of informal favor exchange on networks," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 20(5), pages 639-656, October.
    7. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2018. "The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(4), pages 2195-2211, October.
    8. Bosker, Maarten & Westbrock, Bastian, 2014. "A theory of trade in a global production network," CEPR Discussion Papers 9870, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Acemoglu, Daron & Malekian, Azarakhsh & Ozdaglar, Asu, 2016. "Network security and contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 536-585.
    10. Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Iyengar, Sitharama S. & Kumar, Rajnish & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2016. "Network connectivity under node failure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 164-167.
    11. Landwehr, Jakob, 2015. "Network design and imperfect defense," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 537, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    12. Britta Hoyer & Stephanie Rosenkranz, 2018. "Determinants of Equilibrium Selection in Network Formation: An Experiment," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(4), pages 1-1, November.
    13. Deutsch, Yael, 2021. "A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 288(3), pages 1036-1052.
    14. Lasse Kliemann & Elmira Shirazi Sheykhdarabadi & Anand Srivastav, 2017. "Swap Equilibria under Link and Vertex Destruction," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(1), pages 1-1, February.
    15. Djawadi, Behnud Mir & Endres, Angelika & Hoyer, Britta & Recker, Sonja, 2019. "Network formation and disruption - An experiment are equilibrium networks too complex?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 708-734.
    16. Haller, Hans & Hoyer, Britta, 2019. "The common enemy effect under strategic network formation and disruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 146-163.

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    Strategic Network Disruption; Strategic Network Design; Non-cooperative Network Games; Ordered by external client;

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