IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

The Enemy You Can't See: An Investigation of the Disruption of Dark Networks

  • Michael McBride

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • David Hewitt

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Whittier College)

We examine the optimal disruption of dark (covert and illegal) networks. Of central importance is that an interventionist will generally have incomplete information about the dark network's architecture. We derive the optimal disruption strategy in a stylized model of dark network intervention with incomplete information and show how it combines features of two types of disruption considered in the literature: random failure and targeted attacks. In particular, the optimal disruption strategy encourages greater risk as less of the architecture is observed. A laboratory experiment finds that subjects tasked with disrupting a dark network qualitatively mimic the theoretical predictions.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2012-13/mcbride-07.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 121307.

as
in new window

Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:121307
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Irvine, CA 92697-3125

Phone: (949) 824-5788
Web page: http://www.economics.uci.edu/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2004. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Working Papers 178, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
  3. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks," Working Papers 10-14, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Daniel G Arce & Rachel TA Croson & Catherine C Eckel, 2011. "Terrorism Experiments," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 48(3), pages 373-382, May.
  6. Michael D. Intriligator, 2010. "The Economics Of Terrorism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 48(1), pages 1-13, 01.
  7. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2009. "An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
    [Eine experimentelle Untersuchung von „Colonel Blotto“-Spielen]
    ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-08, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  8. Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-109, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  9. Peren Arin, K. & Lorz, Oliver & Reich, Otto F.M. & Spagnolo, Nicola, 2011. "Exploring the dynamics between terrorism and anti-terror spending: Theory and UK-evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 189-202, February.
  10. Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2006. "How to Organize Crime," Working Papers 06-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  11. Cary Deck & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Fight or Flight?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(6), pages 1069-1088, December.
  12. Jonathan S. Feinstein & Edward H. Kaplan, 2010. "Analysis of a Strategic Terror Organization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 281-302, April.
  13. Walter Enders & Xuejuan Su, 2007. "Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 33-57, February.
  14. Walter Enders & Paan Jindapon, 2010. "Network Externalities and the Structure of Terror Networks," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 262-280, April.
  15. K.J.M. De Jaegher & B. Hoyer, 2010. "Strategic Network Disruption and Defense," Working Papers 10-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
  16. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2008. "How to Organize Crime -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 1039-1067.
  17. Kosfeld Michael, 2004. "Economic Networks in the Laboratory: A Survey," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, March.
  18. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1251, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  19. Starmer, C., 1998. "Experiments in Economics...(Should We Trust the Dismal Scientists In White Coats?)," University of East Anglia Discussion Papers in Economics 9801, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  20. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  21. Das, Satya P., 2008. "Some mechanisms of terror cycles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 644-656, September.
  22. Cameron, Samuel, 1988. "The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 301-23.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:121307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jennifer dos Santos)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.