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Network Externalities and the Structure of Terror Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Walter Enders

    (Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA)

  • Paan Jindapon

    (Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA, pjindapo@cba.ua.edu)

Abstract

The authors analyze the optimal network structure of two types of terrorist organizations. In the centralized network, the leadership selects the level of individual effort and the level of group connectivity so as to maximize the expected net welfare of the organization’s membership. Leaders in loosely connected networks will also seek to balance the trade-off between security and communications. However, with decentralized decision making, the individual nodes may not make optimal decisions from the group’s perspective. As a consequence, the decentralized decision-making process is suboptimal from the overall perspective of the network. In particular, the leadership in a centralized network is able to coordinate the activities of all network members and to take advantage of important network externalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Walter Enders & Paan Jindapon, 2010. "Network Externalities and the Structure of Terror Networks," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 262-280, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:54:y:2010:i:2:p:262-280
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002709355439
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Walter Enders & Xuejuan Su, 2007. "Rational Terrorists and Optimal Network Structure," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(1), pages 33-57, February.
    2. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, September.
    3. Bramoulle, Yann & Kranton, Rachel, 2007. "Public goods in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 478-494, July.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu & Gaibulloev, Khusrav & Sandler, Todd, 2025. "Immigration from a terror-prone nation: Destination nation's optimal immigration and counterterrorism policies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    2. Bhan, Aditya & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2018. "Countering Terror Cells: Offence versus Defence," MPRA Paper 88873, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jaspersen, Johannes G. & Montibeller, Gilberto, 2020. "On the learning patterns and adaptive behavior of terrorist organizations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 282(1), pages 221-234.
    4. Alexandra-Maria Bocse, 0. "Hybrid transnational advocacy networks in environmental protection: banning the use of cyanide in European gold mining," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-19.
    5. McBride, Michael & Hewitt, David, 2013. "The enemy you can’t see: An investigation of the disruption of dark networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 32-50.
    6. Anouk S. Rigterink, 2019. "The Wane of Command: Evidence on drone strikes and control within terrorist organizations," OxCarre Working Papers 218, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    7. B. Hoyer, 2012. "Network Disruption and the Common Enemy Effect," Working Papers 12-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
    8. Peter Schram, 2019. "Managing Insurgency," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(10), pages 2319-2353, November.
    9. Aditya Bhan & Tarun Kabiraj, 2019. "Operational externalities and counter-terrorism," Indian Economic Review, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 171-187, June.
    10. Todd Sandler, 2010. "Terrorism and Policy: Introduction," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 54(2), pages 203-213, April.
    11. Schram, Peter, 2021. "Self-managing terror: Resolving agency problems with diverse teams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 240-257.
    12. Edward H. Kaplan, 2012. "OR Forum---Intelligence Operations Research: The 2010 Philip McCord Morse Lecture," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(6), pages 1297-1309, December.
    13. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Todd Sandler, 2023. "The Trade-Offs of Counterterrorism Policies," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 105(3), pages 177-197, July.
    14. Alexandra-Maria Bocse, 2021. "Hybrid transnational advocacy networks in environmental protection: banning the use of cyanide in European gold mining," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 285-303, June.

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