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Network connectivity under node failure

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  • Billand, Pascal
  • Bravard, Christophe
  • Iyengar, Sitharama S.
  • Kumar, Rajnish
  • Sarangi, Sudipta

Abstract

We examine a non-cooperative model of network formation where players may stop functioning. We identify conditions under which Nash and efficient networks will remain connected after the loss of k nodes by introducing the notion of k-Node Super Connectivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Iyengar, Sitharama S. & Kumar, Rajnish & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2016. "Network connectivity under node failure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 164-167.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:164-167
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1518-1542.
    2. Dziubiński, Marcin & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2013. "Network design and defence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 30-43.
    3. Britta Hoyer & Kris De Jaegher, 2016. "Strategic Network Disruption and Defense," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(5), pages 802-830, October.
    4. Haller, Hans & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2005. "Nash networks with heterogeneous links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 181-201, September.
    5. Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2014. "Attack, Defence, and Contagion in Networks," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1518-1542.
    6. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "original papers : A strategic analysis of network reliability," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(3), pages 205-228.
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    Cited by:

    1. Borkotokey, Surajit & Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Gilles, Robert P. & Gogoi, Loyimee & Kumar, Rajnish, 2021. "Probabilistic network values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 169-180.
    2. Bougheas, Spiros, 2022. "Contagion in networks: Stability and efficiency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 64-77.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • R4 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics

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