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Confirming Information Flows in Networks

  • Sudipta Sarangi


  • Pascal Billand


  • Christophe Bravard


  • Jurjen Kamphorst


Our paper belongs to the strand of literature associated with the notion of Nash networks introduced by Bala and Goyal [1] in the connections model. Our aim is to consider situations where agent i has concerns about the validity of information that she acquires from agent j. Independently con rming this information through another set of agents allows i to put more faith in j's information, that is increases the value of j's information. In such situations, we characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Then, we provide a condition which ensures the existence of Nash networks when agents play pure strategies. Finally, we characterize the set of strict ecient networks and we discuss the relationship between ecient networks and strict Nash networks.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Louisiana State University in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 2012-02.

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Handle: RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2012-02
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  1. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Jurjen Kamphorst, 2003. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Economics Discussion Papers 562, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  2. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2010. "The Law of the Few," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1468-92, September.
  3. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Strict Nash networks and partner heterogeneity," Post-Print halshs-00617713, HAL.
  4. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Resources Flows Asymmetries in Strict Nash Networks with Partner Heterogeneity," Working Papers 1108, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
  5. Bala, V. & Goyal, S., 1995. "Learning from Neighbors," Econometric Institute Research Papers EI 9549-/A, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Econometric Institute.
  6. Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October.
  7. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Nash Networks With Imperfect Reliability And Heterogeous Players," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 13(02), pages 181-194.
  8. Sudipta Sarangi & Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard, . "On the Interaction between Heterogeneity and Decay in Directed Networks," Departmental Working Papers 2010-04, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
  9. Haller, Hans & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2005. "Nash networks with heterogeneous links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 181-201, September.
  10. Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2008. "Core and periphery in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 295-309, March.
  11. K. de Jaegher & J.J.A. Kamphorst, 2009. "Two-way Flow Networks with Small Decay," Working Papers 09-34, Utrecht School of Economics.
  12. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "original papers : A strategic analysis of network reliability," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 205-228.
  13. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
  14. K. de Jaegher & J.J.A. Kamphorst, 2008. "Network formation with decreasing marginal benefits of information," Working Papers 08-16, Utrecht School of Economics.
  15. Kim, Chongmin & Wong, Kam-Chau, 2007. "Network formation and stable equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 536-549, March.
  16. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Strict Nash networks and partner heterogeneity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 515-525, August.
  17. repec:use:tkiwps:1616 is not listed on IDEAS
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