Confirming Information Flows in Networks
Our paper belongs to the strand of literature associated with the notion of Nash networks introduced by Bala and Goyal  in the connections model. Our aim is to consider situations where agent i has concerns about the validity of information that she acquires from agent j. Independently confirming this information through another set of agents allows i to put more faith in j's information, that is increases the value of j's information. In such situations, we characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Then, we provide a condition which ensures the existence of Nash networks when agents play pure strategies. Finally, we characterize the set of strict efficient networks and we discuss the relationship between efficient networks and strict Nash networks.
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