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Resources Flows Asymmetries in Strict Nash Networks with Partner Heterogeneity

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  • Pascal Billand

    (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69003, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France)

  • Christophe Bravard

    (Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France)

  • Sudipta Sarangi

    (Department of Economics, Virginia Tech and Louisiana State University)

Abstract

This paper introduces a partner heterogeneity assumption in the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). Our goal consists in the characterization of strict Nash networks with regard to the set of resources obtained by players. We use the notion of condensation network which allows us to divide the population in sets of players who obtain the same resources and we order these sets according to the resources obtained. Accordingly, we can examine the relationship between heterogeneity and asymmetries in networks. We establish that the nature of heterogeneity plays a crucial role on asymmetries observed in equilibrium networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Resources Flows Asymmetries in Strict Nash Networks with Partner Heterogeneity," Working Papers 1108, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1108
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Barabási, Albert-László & Albert, Réka & Jeong, Hawoong, 2000. "Scale-free characteristics of random networks: the topology of the world-wide web," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 281(1), pages 69-77.
    2. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi, 2011. "Strict Nash networks and partner heterogeneity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(3), pages 515-525, August.
    3. Haller, Hans & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2005. "Nash networks with heterogeneous links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 181-201, September.
    4. McBride, Michael, 2008. "Position-specific information in social networks: Are you connected?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 283-295, September.
    5. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
    6. Andrea Galeotti, 2006. "One-way flow networks: the role of heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 163-179, September.
    7. Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006. "Network formation with heterogeneous players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 353-372, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Jacques Durieu & Sudipta Sarangi, 2019. "Firm Heterogeneity And The Pattern Of R&D Collaborations," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(4), pages 1896-1914, October.
    2. Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe & Kamphorst, Jurjen & Sarangi, Sudipta, 2017. "Network formation when players seek confirmation of information," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 20-31.
    3. Charoensook, Banchongsan, 2015. "On the Interaction between Player Heterogeneity and Partner Heterogeneity in Strict Nash Networks," MPRA Paper 61205, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Banchongsan Charoensook, 2020. "On the Interaction between Small Decay, Agent Heterogeneity and Diameter of Minimal Strict Nash Networks in Two-way Flow Model," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 21(2), pages 331-361, November.
    5. Pascal Billand & Christophe Bravard & Sudipta Sarangi & J. Kamphorst, 2011. "Confirming information flows in networks," Post-Print halshs-00672351, HAL.
    6. Charoensook, Banchongsan, 2017. "Violations of Uniform Partner Ranking Condition in Two-way Flow Strict Nash Networks," MPRA Paper 77961, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Pramod C. Mane & Kapil Ahuja & Nagarajan Krishnamurthy, 2020. "Stability, efficiency, and contentedness of social storage networks," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 811-842, April.
    8. Kinateder, Markus & Merlino, Luca Paolo, 2022. "Local public goods with weighted link formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 316-327.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash networks; one-way flow model; condensation networks; chain; inf-semi-lattice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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