Existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models
This paper addresses the existence of Nash equilibria in one-way flow or directed network models in a number of different settings. In these models players form costly links with other players and obtain resources from them through the directed path connecting them. We find that heterogeneity in the costs of establishing links play a crucial role in the existence of Nash networks. We also provide conditions for the existence of Nash networks in models where costs and values of links are heterogeneous.
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Volume (Year): 37 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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References listed on IDEAS
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