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The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests

Author

Listed:
  • Aleksander Berentsen
  • Esther Bruegger
  • Simon Loertscher

Abstract

Consider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with local information. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of the model: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular we find that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents are maximally segregated.

Suggested Citation

  • Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, 2007. "The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests," IEW - Working Papers 314, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:zur:iewwpx:314
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    File URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/52269/1/iewwp314.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B. & Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner, 2000. "An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-19, October.
    2. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kräkel, Matthias, 2005. "Doping in Contest-Like Situations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 46, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    2. Kräkel, Matthias, 2006. "Doping and Cheating in Contest-Like Situations," IZA Discussion Papers 2059, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Krakel, Matthias, 2007. "Doping and cheating in contest-like situations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 988-1006, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary game theory; imitation dynamics; heterogeneity; local information; global interaction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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