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役員持株は企業業績に影響を与えるか？, The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance: Case in Japan

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  • 久保, 克行
  • Kubo, Katsuyuki
  • クボ, カツユキ

Abstract

この論文の目的は、役員が自身所有する当該企業の株式数と企業業績の関係を分析することにある。この論文では､役員による株式保有が企業業績に正の影響を与えていることを、日本の上場企業のデータを用いて実証的に示した。この結果は役員の持株がいわゆるエージェンシー問題に対するひとつの解決となっていることを示唆している。, The effect of managerial ownership on firm performance: case in Japan Although average Japanese director own their companies' stocks of 70 million yen (560,000 us dollar), there has been few studies on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm's performance in Japan. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of managerial ownership on firm performance in Japan. According to agency theory, the company with higher managerial ownership may perform better than those without, as managers may want to maximise their own interest. We estimate the determinants of firm performance using micro data of 208 large listed companies in 1992-1996. We found that there is positive and significant relationship between managerial ownership and firm's profit. These results suggest that managerial ownership may motivate managers to work hard toward firm's performance.

Suggested Citation

  • 久保, 克行 & Kubo, Katsuyuki & クボ, カツユキ, 2001. "役員持株は企業業績に影響を与えるか？, The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance: Case in Japan," CEI Working Paper Series 2001-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hitcei:2001-5
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    File URL: https://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/13954/wp2001-5a.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aoki, Masahiko & Patrick, Hugh (ed.), 1995. "The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288992, Decembrie.
    2. Xu, Peng, 1997. "Executive Salaries as Tournament Prizes and Executive Bonuses as Managerial Incentives in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 319-346, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    managerial ownership; corporate governance; incentive;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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