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Monitoring and sanctioning in the commons: An application to forestry

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  • Coleman, Eric A.
  • Steed, Brian C.

Abstract

We examine theoretical determinants of monitoring and sanctioning at both the local community level and from external government agents using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. We then estimate a bivariate probit statistical model to test the theory using data from 100 forests in 14 countries collected by the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program. Among other things, we find that a right to harvest some portion of the resource is an important determinant of local monitoring and sanctioning. The number of external aid agencies and NGOs is an important determinant of external monitoring and sanctioning.

Suggested Citation

  • Coleman, Eric A. & Steed, Brian C., 2009. "Monitoring and sanctioning in the commons: An application to forestry," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 2106-2113, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:68:y:2009:i:7:p:2106-2113
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Agrawal, Arun, 2001. "Common Property Institutions and Sustainable Governance of Resources," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(10), pages 1649-1672, October.
    3. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
    4. Cardenas, Juan Camilo & Stranlund, John & Willis, Cleve, 2000. "Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(10), pages 1719-1733, October.
    5. Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, 2004. "Norms from outside and from inside: an experimental analysis on the governance of local ecosystems," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3-4), pages 229-241, June.
    6. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "The demand for punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 522-542, April.
    7. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2007. "The Effect Of Rewards And Sanctions In Provision Of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 671-690, October.
    8. Bardhan, Pranab & Bowles, Samuel & Gintis, Herbert, 2000. "Wealth inequality, wealth constraints and economic performance," Handbook of Income Distribution,in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 10, pages 541-603 Elsevier.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:86:y:1992:i:02:p:404-417_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Gibson, Clark C. & Williams, John T. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2005. "Local Enforcement and Better Forests," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 273-284, February.
    11. Blaikie, Piers, 2006. "Is Small Really Beautiful? Community-based Natural Resource Management in Malawi and Botswana," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(11), pages 1942-1957, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Elinor Ostrom, 2012. "Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 3(54), May.
    2. Villamayor-Tomas, Sergio, 2014. "Cooperation in common property regimes under extreme drought conditions: Empirical evidence from the use of pooled transferable quotas in Spanish irrigation systems," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 482-493.
    3. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-672, June.
    4. Hayes, Tanya & Murtinho, Felipe & Wolff, Hendrik, 2017. "The Impact of Payments for Environmental Services on Communal Lands: An Analysis of the Factors Driving Household Land-Use Behavior in Ecuador," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 427-446.
    5. Coleman, Eric A. & Fleischman, Forrest D., 2012. "Comparing Forest Decentralization and Local Institutional Change in Bolivia, Kenya, Mexico, and Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 836-849.
    6. Hayes, Tanya & Murtinho, Felipe & Wolff, Hendrik, 2015. "An institutional analysis of Payment for Environmental Services on collectively managed lands in Ecuador," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 81-89.
    7. Coleman, Eric A., 2010. "Implications of external validity for research on polycentric and complex adaptive systems," IAMO Forum 2010: Institutions in Transition – Challenges for New Modes of Governance 52713, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO).
    8. Richter, Andries & Grasman, Johan, 2013. "The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 202-209.

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