How to improve the usage rate of shore power facilities? A multi-agent stochastic evolutionary game approach

Shore power (SP) facilities play a pivotal role in port power systems by enabling grid integration of maritime energy loads and improving energy efficiency, yet their adoption rates remain critically low despite high infrastructure coverage. This study proposes a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model incorporating Gaussian white noise to simulate uncertainties inherent in SP systems. By integrating replicator dynamics and stochastic Taylor expansion with Milstein numerical methods, we analyze strategic interactions among governments, port enterprises, and shipping enterprises within the co-construction system. This paper reveals that: (1) Low-intensity stochastic perturbations drive stable strategies, where governments and ports adopt passive emissions strategies while shippers actively reduce emissions. (2) Economic costs are the primary factor limiting the active participation of ports and shipping enterprises, and dynamic incentive and punishment mechanisms from government can promote stability within system. (3) Elevated environmental stewardship demonstrated by shipping enterprises is shown to significantly improve shore power adoption and decarbonization outcomes. This proactive engagement, however, inadvertently perpetuates regulatory inertia of government. This study advances SP deployment strategies through synergetic optimization of game-theoretic decision-making and electrical infrastructure parameters, providing actionable insights for maritime energy transition policies.