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Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms

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Listed author(s):
  • Nikolai Kukushkin

    ()

Abstract

Game forms are studied where the acyclicity, in a stronger or weaker sense, of (coalition or individual) improvements is ensured in all derivative games. In every game form generated by an ``ordered voting'' procedure, individual improvements converge to Nash equilibria if the players restrict themselves to ``minimal'' strategy changes. A complete description of game forms where all coalition improvement paths lead to strong equilibria is obtained: they are either dictatorial, or voting (or rather lobbing) about two outcomes. The restriction to minimal strategy changes ensures the convergence of coalition improvements to strong equilibria in every game form generated by a ``voting by veto'' procedure.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-010-0231-0
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Article provided by Springer & Game Theory Society in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 40 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 147-177

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:1:p:147-177
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-010-0231-0
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

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Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/182/PS2

Keywords: Improvement dynamics; Game form; Perfect information; Potential game; Voting by veto; C72;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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