Nash and Strongly Consistent Two-Player Game Forms
A two-player game form is Nash-consistent if and only if it is tight (Gurvich). Therefore Nash-consistency of two-player game forms depends only on the effectivity structure. This fact is no longer true for strong consistency. In this paper we introduce a new object called the joint effectivity structure and define the exact joint effectivity set. These notions are similar though more sophisticated than the usual effectivity functions. We prove that a two-player game form is strongly consistent if and only if it is tight and jointly exact. Joint exactness is a property of the exact joint effectivity set which basically requires that the joint exact effectivity set coincides with the classical effectivity function. As a corollary we have a characterization of two-player strongly implementable social choice correspondences.
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Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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