Nash and Strongly Consistent Two-Player Game Forms
A two-player game form is Nash-consistent if and only if it is tight (Gurvich). Therefore Nash-consistency of two-player game forms depends only on the effectivity structure. This fact is no longer true for strong consistency. In this paper we introduce a new object called the joint effectivity structure and define the exact joint effectivity set. These notions are similar though more sophisticated than the usual effectivity functions. We prove that a two-player game form is strongly consistent if and only if it is tight and jointly exact. Joint exactness is a property of the exact joint effectivity set which basically requires that the joint exact effectivity set coincides with the classical effectivity function. As a corollary we have a characterization of two-player strongly implementable social choice correspondences.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 24 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00182/index.htm |
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:345-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.