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Cournot tatonnement and potentials


  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S.


We study what topological assumptions should be added to the acyclicity of individual best response improvements in order to ensure the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium as well as the possibility to reach a Nash equilibrium in the limit of a best response improvement path.

Suggested Citation

  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2012. "Cournot tatonnement and potentials," MPRA Paper 43188, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:43188

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. William Novshek, 1985. "On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(1), pages 85-98.
    2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2004. "Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 94-110, July.
    3. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2007. "Congestion games revisited," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 57-83, September.
    4. Kandori Michihiro & Rob Rafael, 1995. "Evolution of Equilibria in the Long Run: A General Theory and Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 383-414, April.
    5. Shannon, Chris, 1995. "Weak and Strong Monotone Comparative Statics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 209-227, March.
    6. Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2006. "Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 77-94, January.
    7. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    8. Voorneveld, Mark, 2000. "Best-response potential games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 289-295, March.
    9. Martin Jensen, 2010. "Aggregative games and best-reply potentials," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 45-66, April.
    10. Milchtaich, Igal, 1996. "Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 111-124, March.
    11. Morris, Stephen & Ui, Takashi, 2004. "Best response equivalence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 260-287, November.
    12. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
    13. Moulin, Herve, 1984. "Dominance solvability and cournot stability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, February.
    14. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2008. "Maximizing an interval order on compact subsets of its domain," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 195-206, September.
    15. Francisco Facchinei & Veronica Piccialli & Marco Sciandrone, 2011. "Decomposition algorithms for generalized potential games," Computational Optimization and Applications, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 237-262, October.
    16. Kukushkin Nikolai S., 1994. "A Condition for the Existence of a Nash Equilibrium in Games with Public and Private Objectives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 177-192, September.
    17. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
    18. Nikolai S Kukushkin, 2004. "'Strategic supplements' in games with polylinear interactions," Game Theory and Information 0411008, EconWPA, revised 28 Feb 2005.
    19. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
    20. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2011. "Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 387-392, May.
    21. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Thuijsman, Frank, 2017. "Adaptive Learning in Weighted Network Games," Research Memorandum 025, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

    More about this item


    Cournot tatonnement; Cournot potential; game with structured utilities; aggregative game;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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