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Cournot tatonnement in aggregative games with monotone best responses

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  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S.

Abstract

This paper establishes the acyclicity of Cournot tatonnement in a strategic game with aggregation and monotone best responses, under the broadest assumptions on aggregation rules allowing the Huang-Dubey-Haimanko-Zapechelnyuk-Jensen trick to work and with minimal topological restrictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2015. "Cournot tatonnement in aggregative games with monotone best responses," MPRA Paper 66976, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:66976
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William Novshek, 1985. "On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(1), pages 85-98.
    2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2004. "Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 94-110, July.
    3. Shannon, Chris, 1995. "Weak and Strong Monotone Comparative Statics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 209-227, March.
    4. Dubey, Pradeep & Haimanko, Ori & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2006. "Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 77-94, January.
    5. Martin Jensen, 2010. "Aggregative games and best-reply potentials," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(1), pages 45-66, April.
    6. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1994. "A fixed-point theorem for decreasing mappings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 23-26, September.
    7. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
    8. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2008. "Maximizing an interval order on compact subsets of its domain," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 195-206, September.
    9. Nikolai Kukushkin, 2013. "Monotone comparative statics: changes in preferences versus changes in the feasible set," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 52(3), pages 1039-1060, April.
    10. Smith, Tony E, 1974. "On the Existence of Most-Preferred Alternatives," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 184-194, February.
    11. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
    12. Nikolai S Kukushkin, 2004. "'Strategic supplements' in games with polylinear interactions," Game Theory and Information 0411008, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Feb 2005.
    13. Marco LiCalzi & Arthur F. Veinott, 2005. "Subextremal functions and lattice programming," GE, Growth, Math methods 0509001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ceparano, Maria Carmela & Quartieri, Federico, 2017. "Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games with isotone best replies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 154-165.
    2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018. "Better response dynamics and Nash equilibrium in discontinuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 68-78.
    3. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2016. "Nash equilibrium with discontinuous utility functions: Reny's approach extended," MPRA Paper 75862, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot tatonnement; Cournot potential; aggregative game; monotone best responses;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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