Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
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More about this item
KeywordsAggregative games; Aggregation; Strategic substitutes; Nash equilibrium; Potential game; Best-reply dynamics; C72;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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