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Space Debris Removal: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Klima

    (Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK)

  • Daan Bloembergen

    (Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK)

  • Rahul Savani

    (Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK)

  • Karl Tuyls

    (Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK)

  • Daniel Hennes

    (DFKI GmbH, 28359 Bremen, Germany)

  • Dario Izzo

    (Advanced Concepts Team, European Space Agency, 2201 AZ Noordwijk, The Netherlands)

Abstract

We analyse active space debris removal efforts from a strategic, game-theoretical perspective. Space debris is non-manoeuvrable, human-made objects orbiting Earth, which pose a significant threat to operational spacecraft. Active debris removal missions have been considered and investigated by different space agencies with the goal to protect valuable assets present in strategic orbital environments. An active debris removal mission is costly, but has a positive effect for all satellites in the same orbital band. This leads to a dilemma: each agency is faced with the choice between the individually costly action of debris removal, which has a positive impact on all players; or wait and hope that others jump in and do the ‘dirty’ work. The risk of the latter action is that, if everyone waits, the joint outcome will be catastrophic, leading to what in game theory is referred to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’. We introduce and thoroughly analyse this dilemma using empirical game theory and a space debris simulator. We consider two- and three-player settings, investigate the strategic properties and equilibria of the game and find that the cost/benefit ratio of debris removal strongly affects the game dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Klima & Daan Bloembergen & Rahul Savani & Karl Tuyls & Daniel Hennes & Dario Izzo, 2016. "Space Debris Removal: A Game Theoretic Analysis," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(3), pages 1-18, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jgames:v:7:y:2016:i:3:p:20-:d:75794
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Adilov, Nodir & Alexander, Peter J. & Cunningham, Brendan M., 2018. "An economic “Kessler Syndrome”: A dynamic model of earth orbit debris," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 79-82.
    2. Rao, Akhil & Burgess, Matthew & Kaffine, Daniel, 2020. "Orbital-use fees could more than quadruple the value of the space industry," MPRA Paper 112708, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Zachary Grzelka & Jeffrey Wagner, 2019. "Managing Satellite Debris in Low-Earth Orbit: Incentivizing Ex Ante Satellite Quality and Ex Post Take-Back Programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(1), pages 319-336, September.
    4. Bernhard, Pierre & Deschamps, Marc & Zaccour, Georges, 2023. "Large satellite constellations and space debris: Exploratory analysis of strategic management of the space commons," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 304(3), pages 1140-1157.
    5. Bongers, Anelí & Torres, José L., 2023. "Orbital debris and the market for satellites," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    6. Sébastien Rouillon, 2020. "A Physico-Economic Model of Low Earth Orbit Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(4), pages 695-723, December.

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