Cournot tatonnement and Nash equilibrium in binary status games
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- Kukushkin, Nikolai S. & von Mouche, Pierre H.M., 2018. "Cournot tatonnement and Nash equilibrium in binary status games," MPRA Paper 86178, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
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Keywordsstatus game; Cournot tatonnement; Nash equilibrium;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
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