Teamwork Efficiency and Company Size
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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2014-0040
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- Galashin, Mikhail & Popov, Sergey, 2014. "Teamwork Efficiency and Company Size," MPRA Paper 58540, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
team; partnership; effort complementarities; firm size;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
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