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Quasiseparable aggregation in games with common local utilities

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  • Kukushkin, Nikolai

Abstract

Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is an aggregate of local utilities obtained from the use of certain "facilities." All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. Individual improvements in such a game are acyclic if a "trimness" condition is satisfied by every facility and all aggregation rules are consistent with a separable ordering. Those conditions are satisfied, for instance, by bottleneck congestion games with an infinite set of facilities. Under appropriate additional assumptions, the existence of a Nash equilibrium is established.

Suggested Citation

  • Kukushkin, Nikolai, 2019. "Quasiseparable aggregation in games with common local utilities," MPRA Paper 93588, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:93588
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/93588/1/MPRA_paper_93588.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2018. "A universal construction generating potential games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 331-340.
    2. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 1999. "Potential games: a purely ordinal approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 279-283, September.
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    5. Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2011. "Games of social interactions with local and global externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-90, April.
    6. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2017. "Strong Nash equilibrium in games with common and complementary local utilities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 1-12.
    7. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2014. "Rosenthal's potential and a discrete version of the Debreu--Gorman Theorem," MPRA Paper 54171, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Tobias Harks & Max Klimm & Rolf Möhring, 2013. "Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 461-482, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bottleneck congestion game; Game with structured utilities; Potential game; Aggregation; Separable ordering;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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