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Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms

Author

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  • Peter Duersch

    ()

  • Albert Kolb
  • Jörg Oechssler

    ()

  • Burkhard Schipper

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Peter Duersch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2010. "Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(3), pages 407-430, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:43:y:2010:i:3:p:407-430
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0446-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 2002. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(4), pages 973-997.
    4. Mathias Drehmann & Jörg Oechssler & Andreas Roider, 2005. "Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets: An Internet Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1403-1426, December.
    5. Shachat, Jason & Swarthout, J. Todd, 2012. "Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 383-402.
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    17. Laslier, Jean-Francois & Topol, Richard & Walliser, Bernard, 2001. "A Behavioral Learning Process in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 340-366, November.
    18. Schipper, Burkhard C, 2011. "Strategic control of myopic best reply in repeated games," MPRA Paper 30219, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana Ania, 2005. "The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 497-516, October.
    20. Dürsch, Peter & Kolb, Albert & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard, 2005. "Rage against the machines : how subjects learn to play against computers," Papers 05-36, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    21. Jose Alpesteguia & Steffen Huck & Jörg Oechssler, 2003. "Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 1049, CESifo.
    22. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 25-36, February.
    2. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2012. "Unbeatable imitation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 88-96.
    3. Burkhard Schipper, 2015. "Strategic teaching and learning in games," Working Papers 152, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Chernov, G. & Susin, I., 2019. "Models of learning in games: An overview," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 44(4), pages 77-125.
    5. Burkhard Schipper & Peter Duersch & Joerg Oechssler, 2011. "Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games," Working Papers 26, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    6. Boyer, Tristan & Jonard, Nicolas, 2014. "Imitation and efficient contagion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 20-32.
    7. Ali Al-Nowaihi & Sanjit Dhami, 2015. "Evidential Equilibria: Heuristics and Biases in Static Games of Complete Information," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 6(4), pages 1-40, November.
    8. Timothy Cason & Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2013. "Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 335-357, October.
    9. Daan Lindeman & Marius I. Ochea, 2018. "Imitation Dynamics in Oligopoly Games with Heterogeneous Players," THEMA Working Papers 2018-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    10. Ralph-C. Bayer & Elke Renner & Rupert Sausgruber, 2013. "Confusion and learning in the voluntary contributions game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 478-496, December.
    11. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
    12. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2012. "Unbeatable imitation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 88-96.
    13. Sanjit Dhami & ali al-Nowaihi, 2012. "Evidential equilibria in static games," Discussion Papers in Economics 12/15, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    14. Christoph March, 2019. "The Behavioral Economics of Artificial Intelligence: Lessons from Experiments with Computer Players," CESifo Working Paper Series 7926, CESifo.
    15. Burkhard Schipper & Peter Duersch & Joerg Oechssler, 2011. "Once Beaten, Never Again: Imitation in Two-Player Potential Games," Working Papers 1112, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    16. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2009. "Incentives for subjects in internet experiments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 120-122, October.
    17. Burkhard Schipper, 2015. "Strategic teaching and learning in games," Working Papers 151, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    18. Burkhard C. Schipper, 2019. "Dynamic Exploitation of Myopic Best Response," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 1143-1167, December.
    19. repec:gam:jgames:v:6:y:2015:i:4:p:637-677:d:58900 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-052 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Tristan Boyer & Nicolas Jonard, 2014. "Imitation and Efficient Contagion," Working Papers 2014-52, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    22. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2013. "Evidential equilibria: Heuristics and biases in static games," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/25, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    23. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 25-36, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Learning; Fictitious play; Imitation; Reinforcement; Trial & error; Strategic teaching; Cournot duopoly; Experiments; Internet; C72; C91; C92; D43; L13;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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