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Incentives for Subjects in Internet Experiments

  • Burkhard C. Schipper
  • Jörg Oechssler

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Internet experiments are a new and convenient way for reaching a large subject pool. Yet, providing incentives to subjects can be a tricky design issue. One cost effective and simple method is the publication of a high score (as in computer games). We test whether a high score provides adequate and non-distortionary incentives by comparing it to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences and conclude that high scores are not always appropriate as an incentive device. Performance based financial incentives seem to be required also in internet experiments.

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Paper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 81.

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Length: 15
Date of creation: 21 Feb 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:08-1
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  1. Bossaerts, Peter & Plott, Charles, 2000. "Basic Principles Of Asset Pricing Theory: Evidence From Large-Scale Experimental Financial Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2578, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Mathias Drehmann & Joerg Oechssler & Andreas Roider, 2002. "Herding and Contrarian Behavior in Financial Markets - An Internet Experiment," Experimental 0210001, EconWPA.
  3. Peter Duersch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2010. "Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 407-430, June.
  4. Drehmann, Mathias & Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas, 2005. "Herding With and Without Payoff Externalities - An Internet Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5310, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2003. "Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 4(2), pages 243-265, 05.
  6. David Lucking-Reiley, 1999. "Using field experiments to test equivalence between auction formats: Magic on the internet," Framed Field Experiments 00183, The Field Experiments Website.
  7. V. Anderhub & R. Müller & C. Schmidt, 1998. "Design and Evaluation of an Economic Experiment via the Internet," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1998,69, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  8. Albert Satorra & Antoni Bosch-Domenech & Jose Garcia-Montalvo & Rosemarie Nagel, 2002. "One, two, (three), infinity: Newspaper and lab beauty-contest experiments," Artefactual Field Experiments 00011, The Field Experiments Website.
  9. Ben Greiner & H.-Arno Jacobsen & Carsten Schmidt, 2002. "The Virtual Laboratory Infrstructure for Online Economic Experiments," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-35, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  10. Shavit, Tal & Sonsino, Doron & Benzion, Uri, 2001. "A comparative study of lotteries-evaluation in class and on the Web," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 483-491, August.
  11. Oechssler, Jörg & Roider, Andreas & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  12. Forsythe, Robert & Rietz, Thomas A. & Ross, Thomas W., 1999. "Wishes, expectations and actions: a survey on price formation in election stock markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-110, May.
  13. Forsythe, Robert & Forrest Nelson & George R. Neumann & Jack Wright, 1992. "Anatomy of an Experimental Political Stock Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1142-61, December.
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