IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eecrev/v38y1994i3-4p847-858.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Evolutionary game theory

Author

Listed:
  • Van Damme, Eric

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Van Damme, Eric, 1994. "Evolutionary game theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 847-858, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:3-4:p:847-858
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0014-2921(94)90121-X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Van Damme, Eric, 1994. "Evolutionary game theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 847-858, April.
    2. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1991. "Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 141-146, June.
    3. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-1281, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. van Raalte, C.L.J.P., 1996. "Market formation and market selection," Other publications TiSEM 5b11cea5-dfe7-4a8c-adb9-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. J.A.J. Metz & S.D. Mylius & O. Diekmann, 1996. "When Does Evolution Optimize? On the Relation Between Types of Density Dependence and Evolutionarily Stable Life History Parameters," Working Papers wp96004, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    3. Chaitanya Gokhale & Arne Traulsen, 2014. "Evolutionary Multiplayer Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 468-488, December.
    4. Mauricio G. Villena & Marcelo J. Villena, 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 585-610, September.
    5. Rodrigo Harrison & Mauricio Villena, 2008. "The Evolution of Social Norms and Individual Preferences," Documentos de Trabajo 333, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    6. Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020. "The evolution of taking roles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 38-63.
    7. van Damme, E.E.C., 1995. "Game theory : The next stage," Other publications TiSEM 7779b0f9-bef5-45c7-ae6b-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. Thijssen, J.J.J., 2003. "Investment under uncertainty, market evolution and coalition spillovers in a game theoretic perspective," Other publications TiSEM 672073a6-492e-4621-8d4a-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. Van Damme, Eric, 1994. "Evolutionary game theory," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 847-858, April.
    10. Ball, Richard, 2017. "Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 100-104.
    11. Dai, Darong, 2012. "On the existence and stability of Pareto optimal endogenous matching with fairness," MPRA Paper 40457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Villani, Salvatore, 2008. "L’emergenza dei tre lustri, la salma contesa e il gioco dell’Ultimatum. Alcune riflessioni sui problemi che caratterizzano le decisioni pubbliche in Italia [The 15-years-long emergency, the burial-," MPRA Paper 29857, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Sep 2008.
    13. van de Ven, J., 2000. "The Economics of the Gift," Other publications TiSEM c4c17d0c-941f-4bb6-b9e6-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. van de Ven, J., 2000. "The Economics of the Gift," Discussion Paper 2000-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. Dirk Helbing & Anders Johansson, 2010. "Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 5(10), pages 1-15, October.
    16. Villena, Mauricio G. & Villena, Marcelo J., 2010. "On the economics of whistle-blowing behavior: the role of incentives," MPRA Paper 35917, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Mar 2010.
    17. César A.Salazar & Mauricio G.Villena, 2005. "Evolución de preferencias bajo escenarios de información completa e incompleta: teoría y evidencia experimental," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 32(2 Year 20), pages 159-186, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. van Damme, E.E.C., 1995. "Game theory : The next stage," Other publications TiSEM 7779b0f9-bef5-45c7-ae6b-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Herold, Florian & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2020. "The evolution of taking roles," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 38-63.
    3. Andreozzi, Luciano, 2013. "Evolutionary stability in repeated extensive games played by finite automata," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 67-74.
    4. Aumann, Robert J., 1997. "Rationality and Bounded Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 2-14, October.
    5. Sethi, Rajiv, 2021. "Stable sampling in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    6. David Baron & Ehud Kalai, 1990. "Dividing a Cake by Majority: The Simplest Equilibria," Discussion Papers 919, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596, Elsevier.
    8. Ambrus, Attila, 2006. "Coalitional Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3200266, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    9. Jun Honda, 2015. "Games with the Total Bandwagon Property," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp197, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    10. Tracy Xiao Liu & Jenna Bednar & Yan Chen & Scott Page, 2019. "Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(3), pages 705-734, September.
    11. Ball, Richard, 2017. "Violations of monotonicity in evolutionary models with sample-based beliefs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 100-104.
    12. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2007. "Expectational coordination in a class of economic models: Strategic substitutabilities versus strategic complementarities," PSE Working Papers halshs-00587837, HAL.
    13. Jean-Luc Gaffard & Mauro Napoletano, 2012. "Agent-based models and economic policy," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/53r60a8s3ku, Sciences Po.
    14. Samahita, Margaret & Holm, Håkan J., 2020. "Mining for Mood Effect in the Field," Working Papers 2020:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    15. Jehiel, Philippe, 1998. "Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 274-298, February.
    16. Prajit K. Dutta & Paolo Siconolfi, 2010. "Mixed strategy equilibria in repeated games with one‐period memory," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 167-187, March.
    17. Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2003. "Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 332-342, August.
    18. Mauricio G. Villena & Marcelo J. Villena, 2004. "Evolutionary Game Theory and Thorstein Veblen’s Evolutionary Economics: Is EGT Veblenian?," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 38(3), pages 585-610, September.
    19. Olivier Compte & Andrew Postlewaite, 2007. "Effecting Cooperation," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 29 May 2009.
    20. Rubinstein, A. & Wolnsky, A., 1992. "A Rermark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games," Papers 4-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:3-4:p:847-858. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.