When Does Evolution Optimize? On the Relation Between Types of Density Dependence and Evolutionarily Stable Life History Parameters
In this paper we (i) put forward a simple notational device clarifying the, undeniable but generally ignored, role of density dependence in determining evolutionarily stable life histories, (ii) use this device to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for (a) the existence of an evolutionary extremization principle, and (b) the reduction of such a principle to straight r- or RO-maximization, (iii) use the latter results to analyze a simple concrete example showing that the details of the population dynamical embedding may influence our evolutionary predictions to an unexpected extent.
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- Van Damme, Eric, 1994.
"Evolutionary game theory,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 847-858, April.
- J.A.J. Metz & S.A.H. Geritz & G. Meszena & F.J.A. Jacobs & J.S.van Heerwaarden, 1995. "Adaptive Dynamics: A Geometrical Study of the Consequences of Nearly Faithful Reproduction," Working Papers wp95099, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
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