IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/sdueko/2012_010.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline

Author

Listed:

Abstract

We consider a congested facility where agents can line up at any time they wish after the facility opens (like airplane boarding, or drivers leaving stadium parking lots after a sports event). We show that in Nash equilibrium, within the general family of stochastic queue disciplines with no capacity waste, the focal first-in-first-out (FIFO) queue discipline is the worst while the last-in-first-out (LIFO) discipline is best.

Suggested Citation

  • Platz, Trine Tornøe & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2012. "The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline," Discussion Papers on Economics 10/2012, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2012_010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.sdu.dk/-/media/files/om_sdu/institutter/ivoe/disc_papers/disc_2012/dpbe10_2012.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), 2011. "A Handbook of Transport Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12679.
    2. Naor, P, 1969. "The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 37(1), pages 15-24, January.
    3. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    4. Glazer, Amihai & Hassin, Refael, 1983. "?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 146-150, June.
    5. Khan, M. Ali & Sun, Yeneng, 2002. "Non-cooperative games with many players," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 1761-1808, Elsevier.
    6. Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-260, May.
    7. Jesper Breinbjerg & Alexander Sebald & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2016. "Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 207-236, September.
    8. de Palma, André & Fosgerau, Mogens, 2013. "Random queues and risk averse users," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 230(2), pages 313-320.
    9. André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Robert Vickerman, 2011. "Handbook Of Transport Economics," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754912, HAL.
    10. Refael Hassin & Yana Kleiner, 2011. "Equilibrium and optimal arrival patterns to a server with opening and closing times," IISE Transactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(3), pages 164-175.
    11. André de Palma & Mogens Fosgerau, 2011. "Dynamic Traffic Modeling," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Hassin, Refael, 1985. "On the Optimality of First Come Last Served Queues," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 201-202, January.
    13. Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1993. "A Structural Model of Peak-Period Congestion: A Traffic Bottleneck with Elastic Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 161-179, March.
    14. Otsubo, Hironori & Rapoport, Amnon, 2008. "Vickrey's model of traffic congestion discretized," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 42(10), pages 873-889, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. [経済]FIFOは最悪、LIFOがベスト
      by himaginary in himaginaryの日記 on 2012-06-14 12:00:00
    2. Why LIFO beats FIFO
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2012-06-14 19:10:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Breinbjerg, Jesper & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Equilibrium Arrival Times to Queues: The Case of Last-Come First-Serve Preemptive-Resume," Discussion Papers on Economics 3/2017, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    2. Jesper Breinbjerg & Alexander Sebald & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2016. "Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 207-236, September.
    3. Baccara, Mariagiovanna & Lee, SangMok & Yariv, Leeat, 2020. "Optimal dynamic matching," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    4. Breinbjerg, Jesper & Platz, Trine Tornøe & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2020. "Equilibrium Arrivals to a Last-come First-served Preemptive-resume Queue," Working Papers 17-2020, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    5. Lingbo Huang & Tracy Xiao Liu & Jun Zhang, 2023. "Born to wait? A study on allocation rules in booking systems," Discussion Papers 2023-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    6. Moshe Haviv & Liron Ravner, 2021. "A survey of queueing systems with strategic timing of arrivals," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 99(1), pages 163-198, October.
    7. Breinbjerg, Jesper, 2016. "Strategic Arrival Times to Queueing Systems," Discussion Papers on Economics 6/2016, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    8. Breinbjerg, Jesper, 2017. "Equilibrium arrival times to queues with general service times and non-linear utility functions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(2), pages 595-605.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jesper Breinbjerg & Alexander Sebald & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2016. "Strategic behavior and social outcomes in a bottleneck queue: experimental evidence," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(3), pages 207-236, September.
    2. Breinbjerg, Jesper & Platz, Trine Tornøe & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2020. "Equilibrium Arrivals to a Last-come First-served Preemptive-resume Queue," Working Papers 17-2020, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    3. de Palma, André & Fosgerau, Mogens, 2013. "Random queues and risk averse users," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 230(2), pages 313-320.
    4. Moshe Haviv & Liron Ravner, 2021. "A survey of queueing systems with strategic timing of arrivals," Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 99(1), pages 163-198, October.
    5. Hugo E. Silva & Robin Lindsey & André de Palma & Vincent A. C. van den Berg, 2017. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in the Bottleneck Model with Atomic Users," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 863-881, August.
    6. Fosgerau, Mogens & de Palma, André, 2013. "The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 106-115.
    7. Sakuma, Yutaka & Masuyama, Hiroyuki & Fukuda, Emiko, 2020. "A discrete-time single-server Poisson queueing game: Equilibria simulated by an agent-based model," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(1), pages 253-264.
    8. Kenneth Small, 2015. "The Bottleneck Model: An Assessment and Interpretation," Working Papers 141506, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    9. Breinbjerg, Jesper & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Equilibrium Arrival Times to Queues: The Case of Last-Come First-Serve Preemptive-Resume," Discussion Papers on Economics 3/2017, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    10. Berliant, Marcus, 2017. "Commuting and internet traffic congestion," MPRA Paper 77378, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Lindsey, Robin, 2012. "Road pricing and investment," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 49-63.
    12. André de Palma & Mogens Fosgerau, 2011. "Dynamic Traffic Modeling," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    13. Fosgerau, Mogens & Lindsey, Robin, 2013. "Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 764-782.
    14. Mogens Fosgerau & Kurt Van Dender, 2013. "Road pricing with complications," Transportation, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 479-503, May.
    15. Small, Kenneth A., 2015. "The bottleneck model: An assessment and interpretation," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 110-117.
    16. Fosgerau, Mogens, 2015. "Congestion in the bathtub," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 241-255.
    17. Ravner, Liron, 2014. "Equilibrium arrival times to a queue with order penalties," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 239(2), pages 456-468.
    18. Small, Kenneth A., 2012. "Valuation of travel time," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 2-14.
    19. Ling-Ling Xiao & Tian-Liang Liu & Hai-Jun Huang, 2021. "Tradable permit schemes for managing morning commute with carpool under parking space constraint," Transportation, Springer, vol. 48(4), pages 1563-1586, August.
    20. Fosgerau, Mogens & Engelson, Leonid & Franklin, Joel P., 2014. "Commuting for meetings," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 104-113.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bottleneck; queue discipline; Nash equilibrium; FIFO; LIFO; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • R41 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2012_010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Astrid Holm Nielsen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/okioudk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.