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The Tragedy of Corruption Corruption as a social dilemma

Listed author(s):
  • Ye-Feng Chen

    (Zhejiang University)

  • Shu-Guang Jiang

    (Shandong University)

  • Marie Claire Villeval

    ()

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - PRES Université de Lyon - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon)

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective failure is introduced when the number of public officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of individual interest prevails and leads to the elimination of honest officials over time. Reducing the size of the groups while increasing the probability of collective failure diminishes the public officials' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the tragedy of corruption altogether.

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File URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01236660v2/document
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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-01236660.

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Date of creation: 2015
Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01236660
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01236660v2
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  1. Balafoutas, Loukas, 2011. "Public beliefs and corruption in a repeated psychological game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 78(1-2), pages 51-59, April.
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