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A controlled field experiment on corruption

  • Armantier, Olivier
  • Boly, Amadou

This paper reports on a controlled field experiment on corruption designed to address two important issues: the experimenter's scrutiny and the unobservability of corruption. In the experiment, a grader is offered a bribe along with a demand for a better grade. We find that graders respond more favorably to bigger bribes, while the effect of higher wages is ambiguous: it lowers the bribe's acceptance, but it fosters reciprocation. Monitoring and punishment can deter corruption, but we cannot reject that it may also crowd-out intrinsic motivations for honesty when intensified. Finally, our results suggest several micro-determinants of corruption including age, ability, religiosity, but not gender.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 55 (2011)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
Pages: 1072-1082

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:55:y:2011:i:8:p:1072-1082
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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