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Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers

Author

Listed:
  • Ralph-C. Bayer
  • Roland Hodler
  • Paul A. Raschky
  • Anthony Strittmatter

Abstract

Using the Panama Papers, we show that the beginning of media reporting on expropriations and property confiscations in a country increases the probability that offshore entities are incorporated by agents from the same country in the same month. This result is robust to the use of country-year fixed effects and the exclusion of tax havens. Further analysis shows that the effect is driven by countries with non-corrupt and effective governments, which supports the notion that offshore entities are incorporated when reasonably well-intended and well-functioning governments become more serious about fighting organized crime by confiscating proceeds of crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Ralph-C. Bayer & Roland Hodler & Paul A. Raschky & Anthony Strittmatter, 2018. "Expropriations, Property Confiscations and New Offshore Entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers," CESifo Working Paper Series 7328, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7328
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & Zoido-Lobaton, Pablo, 1998. "Regulatory Discretion and the Unofficial Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(2), pages 387-392, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    expropriations and confiscations; offshore entities; tax havens; Panama Papers;

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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