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The Limits of Financial Globalization

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Listed author(s):
  • Stulz, Rene M.

    (Ohio State U)

Abstract

Despite the dramatic reduction in explicit barriers to international investment activity over the last 60 years, the impact of financial globalization has been remarkably limited. I argue that country attributes are still critical to financial decision-making because of what I call the twin agency problems. These twin agency problems arise because rulers of sovereign states and corporate insiders pursue their own interests at the expense of outside investors. When these twin agency problems are significant, diffuse ownership is inefficient and corporate insiders must co-invest with other investors, retaining substantial equity. The resulting ownership concentration limits economic growth, financial development, and the ability of a country to take advantage of financial globalization. The twin agency problems help explain why the impact of financial globalization has been limited and why financial globalization can lead to capital flight and financial crises. The impact of financial globalization will remain limited as long as these agency problems are significant.

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File URL: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/papers/2005/2005-1.pdf
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Paper provided by Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2005-1.

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Date of creation: Jan 2005
Handle: RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2005-1
Contact details of provider: Phone: (614) 292-8449
Web page: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/dice/list.htm
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
  • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
  • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
  • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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