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Financial Globalization, Corporate Governance, and Eastern Europe

  • Rene M. Stulz

For many countries, the most significant barriers to trade in financial assets have been knocked down. Yet, the financial world is not flat because poor governance prevents firms from being widely held and from taking full advantage of financial globalization. Poor governance has implications for corporate finance as well as for macroeconomics. I show that poor governance in Eastern Europe is accompanied, as expected, by high corporate ownership concentration, low firm valuation, poor financial development, and low foreign participation.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w11912.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11912.

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Date of creation: Jan 2006
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Publication status: published as Stulz, Rene M. "Financial Globalization, Corporate Governance and Eastern Europe." Financial Development, Integration and Stability: Evidence from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (2006): 16-40.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11912
Note: AP CF
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  13. Lee Pinkowitz & René Stulz & Rohan Williamson, 2006. "Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross-country Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2725-2751, December.
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  17. Kee-Hong Bae & Rene M. Stulz & Hongping Tan, 2005. "Do Local Analysts Know More? A Cross-Country Study of the Performance of Local Analysts and Foreign Analysts," NBER Working Papers 11697, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, G. Andrew & Stulz, Rene M., 2004. "Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 205-238, February.
  19. Klapper, Leora F & Laeven, Luc & Love, Inessa, 2005. "What drives corporate governance? Firm-level evidence from Eastern Europe," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3600, The World Bank.
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  24. Erik BerglöF, 2005. "What do Firms Disclose and Why? Enforcing Corporate Governance and Transparency in Central and Eastern Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 178-197, Summer.
  25. Stulz, Rene M & Wasserfallen, Walter, 1995. "Foreign Equity Investment Restrictions, Capital Flight, and Shareholder Wealth Maximization: Theory and Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(4), pages 1019-57.
  26. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
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