IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Finance and Governance in Developing Economies

  • Randall Morck

    ()

    (Alberta School of Business, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada T6E 2T9, and National Bureau of Economic Research)

Classic Big Push industrialization envisions state planners coordinating economic activity to internalize a range of externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful Big Push coordination may occur instead when a large business group, acting in its controlling shareholder's self-interest, coordinates the establishment and expansion of businesses in diverse sectors. Where business groups play this role, many basic axioms of Anglo-American corporate governance, including the advocacy of shareholder value maximization and contestable corporate control, must be qualified.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-financial-102710-144828
Download Restriction: Full text downloads are only available to subscribers. Visit the abstract page for more information.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Annual Reviews in its journal Annual Review of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 375-406

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:anr:refeco:v:3:y:2011:p:375-406
Contact details of provider: Postal: Annual Reviews 4139 El Camino Way Palo Alto, CA 94306, USA
Web page: http://www.annualreviews.org

Order Information: Web: http://www.annualreviews.org/action/ecommerce

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Booth, L. & Asli Demirgu-Kunt, V.A. & Maksimovic, V., 1999. "Capital Structure in Developing Countries," Rotman School of Management - Finance 00-001, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto.
  2. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," CRSP working papers 526, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  4. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2002. "Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier," NBER Working Papers 9191, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Bernard Yeung & Randall Morck & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth," Working Papers 04-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  6. Da Rin, Marco & Hellmann, Thomas F., 2002. "Banks as Catalysts for Industrialization," Research Papers 1398, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  7. Gopalan, Radhakrishnan & Nanda, Vikram & Seru, Amit, 2007. "Affiliated firms and financial support: Evidence from Indian business groups," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 759-795, December.
  8. de Fontenay, Catherine C., 2004. "The dual role of market power in the Big Push: from evidence to theory," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 221-238, October.
  9. Beason, R. & Weinstein, D.E., 1993. "Growth, Economies of Scale, and Targeting in Japan (1955- 1990)," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1644, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Randall Morck & Michael Percy & Gloria Tian & Bernard Yeung, 2004. "The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm - A History of Corporate Ownership in Canada," NBER Working Papers 10635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
  12. Raghuram Rajan & Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," NBER Working Papers 6368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, 2007. "Business Groups and the Big Push: Meiji Japan's Mass Privatization and Subsequent Growth," NBER Working Papers 13171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck & Jungwook Shim & Yupana Wiwattanakantang, 2010. "Must Love Kill the Family Firm?," NBER Working Papers 16340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm," NBER Working Papers 12206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Maurer, Noel & Sharma, Tridib, 2001. "Enforcing Property Rights Through Reputation: Mexico'S Early Industrialization, 1878 1913," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(04), pages 950-973, December.
  17. Chun, Hyunbae & Kim, Jung-Wook & Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 2008. "Creative destruction and firm-specific performance heterogeneity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 109-135, July.
  18. Berkowitz, Daniel & Li, Wei, 2000. "Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 369-397, June.
  19. Randall Morck & M. Deniz Yavuz & Bernard Yeung, 2009. "Banking System Control, Capital Allocation, and Economy Performance," NBER Working Papers 15575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Bianco, Magda & Nicodano, Giovanna, 2006. "Pyramidal groups and debt," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 937-961, May.
  21. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1996. "Financial Dependence and Growth," NBER Working Papers 5758, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. repec:rne:rneart:v:4:y:2005:i:1:p:4-18 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Bertrand, Marianne & Johnson, Simon & Samphantharak, Krislert & Schoar, Antoinette, 2008. "Mixing family with business: A study of Thai business groups and the families behind them," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 466-498, June.
  24. Randall K. Morck & David A. Strangeland & Bernard Yeung, 1998. "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control and Economic Growth," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 209, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  25. Feenstra, Robert C. & Huang, Deng-Shing & Hamilton, Gary G., 2003. "A market-power based model of business groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 459-485, August.
  26. Becsi, Zsolt & Wang, Ping & Wynne, Mark A., 1999. "Costly intermediation, the big push and the big crash," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 275-293, August.
  27. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2005. "Dividend Taxation and Corporate Governance," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 163-180, Summer.
  28. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control," NBER Working Papers 2532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2003. "Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 585, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  30. repec:aea:jeclit:v:43:y:2005:i:3:p:655-720 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Weinstein, David E & Yafeh, Yishay, 1995. "Japan's Corporate Groups: Collusion or Competitive? An Empirical Investigation of Keiretsu Behavior," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 359-76, December.
  32. Raghuram Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, 2007. "Does Aid Affect Governance?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 322-327, May.
  33. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
  34. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
  35. Peter Skott & Jaime Ros, 1997. "The "Big Push" in an Open Economy with Nontradable Inputs," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 20(1), pages 149-162, October.
  36. Artyom Durnev & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung & Paul Zarowin, 2003. "Does Greater Firm-Specific Return Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5), pages 797-836, December.
  37. Susan Perkins & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2008. "Innocents Abroad: The Hazards of International Joint Ventures with Pyramidal Group Firms," NBER Working Papers 13914, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anr:refeco:v:3:y:2011:p:375-406. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (http://www.annualreviews.org)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.