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Elite behaviour and citizen mobilization

Author

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  • Ivar Kolstad
  • Arne Wiig

Abstract

This paper studies the relation between self-serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. We use a fixed effects approach to analyze the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from 213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998-2014. For well-functioning democracies, we find a positive relation between the use of tax havens and voter turnout, suggesting that self-serving elite behaviour is associated with citizen political mobilization rather than voter apathy. The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis, when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.

Suggested Citation

  • Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, 2015. "Elite behaviour and citizen mobilization," CMI Working Papers 8, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    • Handle: RePEc:chm:wpaper:wp2015-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hamlin, Alan & Jennings, Colin, 2011. "Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(3), pages 645-670, July.
    2. Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, 2014. "The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 65-91, February.
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    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:01:p:25-42_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. James R. Hines & Eric M. Rice, 1994. "Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(1), pages 149-182.
    8. AndrewK. Rose & MarkM. Spiegel, 2007. "Offshore Financial Centres: Parasites or Symbionts?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(523), pages 1310-1335, October.
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    10. repec:cup:apsrev:v:62:y:1968:i:1:p:25-42_1 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Bayer, Ralph-C. & Hodler, Roland & Raschky, Paul A. & Strittmatter, Anthony, 2020. "Expropriations, property confiscations and new offshore entities: Evidence from the Panama Papers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 171(C), pages 132-152.
    2. Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, 2016. "How do voters respond to information on self-serving elite behaviour? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Tanzania," CMI Working Papers 9, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    3. Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wiig, 2016. "How do voters respond to information on self-serving elite behaviour? Evidence from a randomized survey experiment in Tanzania," CMI Working Papers 9, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.

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