Delegation, Incentives and Antitrust Enforcement
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Cited by:
- Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E. & Sorgard, Lars, 2013.
"Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge,"
Discussion Paper Series in Economics
4/2013, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
- Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E. & Sørgard, Lars, 2013. "Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge," Discussion Papers 2013/5, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
- Jensen, Sissel & Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond & Sørgard, Lars, 2013. "Crime and punishment: When tougher antitrust enforcement leads to higher overcharge," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2013/2, University of Stavanger.
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