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Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique

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  • Thierry Penard

    (Crest)

  • Saïd Souam

    (Crest)

Abstract

This article attempts to determine the optimal antitrust policy against price-fixing when competition authorities imperfectly observe firms' behaviour. By investigating or auditing on markets, authorities can detect collusion. We show that the strenght of investigations depends on the characteristics of the market, the cost of investigation, the severity of punishment and the degree of stability of the collusion. Moreover, it is shown that authorities always tolerate some degree of collusion as long as investigation is costly. The results of our paper allow us to establish some guidelines for antitrust policy.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Penard & Saïd Souam, 1999. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Working Papers 99-26, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
  • Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:99-26
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    Cited by:

    1. Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2014. "Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences," Working Papers halshs-00956638, HAL.
    2. Kai Zhao, 2015. "Product competition and R&D investment under spillovers within full or partial collusion games," Latin American Economic Review, Springer;Centro de Investigaciòn y Docencia Económica (CIDE), pages 1-27.
    3. Le Pape, Nicolas & Zhao, Kai, 2014. "Horizontal mergers and uncertainty," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 8, pages 1-31.
    4. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-580 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Sami ALI Debbichi, 2015. "Market Power and competition effect on Interconnection fees: Econometric Estimation of the Mobile Tunisian Market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1227-1236.

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