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Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences

Author

Listed:
  • Sami Debbichi

    (AEDD - Analyse Economique et Développement Durable - UTM - Université de Tunis El Manar)

  • Walid Hichri

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

We try in this paper to characterize the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia. Our study is based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and a comparison of the critical threshold of collusion between operators in developing countries like Tunisia. The market power is estimated based on the work of Parker Roller (1997) and the assumption of "Balanced Calling Pattern". We use then the model of Friedman (1971) to compare the critical threshold of collusion. We show that the "conduct parameter" measuring the intensity of competition is not null during the period 1993-2011. Results show also that collusion is easier on the Tunisian market that on the Algerian, Jordanian, or Moroccan one.

Suggested Citation

  • Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2016. "Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences," Post-Print halshs-01419495, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01419495
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Termination rate; Market power; Competition; Mobile phone Market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
    • L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels

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