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Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia : What Lessons from International Experiences

Listed author(s):
  • Sami Debbichi

    (AEDD - Analyse Economique et Développement Durable - Université de Tunis El Manar)

  • Walid Hichri

    (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

We try in this paper to characterize the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia. Our study is based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and a comparison of the critical threshold of collusion between operators in developing countries like Tunisia. The market power is estimated based on the work of Parker Roller (1997) and the assumption of "Balanced Calling Pattern". We use then the model of Friedman (1971) to compare the critical threshold of collusion. We show that the "conduct parameter" measuring the intensity of competition is not null during the period 1993-2011. Results show also that collusion is easier on the Tunisian market that on the Algerian, Jordanian, or Moroccan one.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-01419495.

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Date of creation: 2016
Publication status: Published in Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management, 2016, 7 (1), pp. 1031-1040
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01419495
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01419495
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

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  1. Artz, Benjamin & Heywood, John S. & McGinty, Matthew, 2009. "The merger paradox in a mixed oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 1-10, March.
  2. Thierry Pénard & Saïd Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 66, pages 209-233.
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  4. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
  5. Edmond BARANES & Laurent FLOCHEL, 1999. "Interconnexion de réseaux et qualité de l’infrastructure comme barrière à l’entrée : quels instruments de régulation?," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1999012, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  6. Berger, Ulrich, 2005. "Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 107-112, January.
  7. Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2013. "Threshold of Preference for Collusion and Interconnection Fees in Different Market Structures : the Tunisian Mobile Market Case," Working Papers 1307, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  8. Dessein, Wouter, 2003. " Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(4), pages 593-611, Winter.
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  10. Harbord David & Pagnozzi Marco, 2010. "Network-Based Price Discrimination and `Bill-and-Keep' vs. `Cost-Based' Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-46, February.
  11. Baranes, Edmond & Poudou, Jean-Christophe, 2010. "Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 172-176, March.
  12. Baranes, E. & Flochel, L., 1997. "Interconnexion de reseaux et qualite de l'infrastructure comme barriere a l'entree: quels instruments de regulation?," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.56, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
  13. Sami Debbichi & Walid Hichri, 2013. "Collusion et structure des coûts dans un marché de duopole mixte vs privé de téléphonie mobile," Working Papers halshs-00822769, HAL.
  14. Wallsten, Scott J, 2001. "An Econometric Analysis of Telecom Competition, Privatization, and Regulation in Africa and Latin America," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 1-19, March.
  15. Reinhard Selten, 1973. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 008, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  16. Felix Höffler, 2009. "Mobile termination and collusion, revisited," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 246-274, June.
  17. Nathalie Colombier & Zouhaïer M’Chirgui & Thierry Pénard, 2010. "Une analyse empirique des stratégies d'interconnexion des opérateurs internet," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(3), pages 25-50.
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