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The hazards of piecemeal reform: british civil courts and the credit market in colonial India

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  • Kranton, Rachel E.
  • Swamy, Anand V.

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  • Kranton, Rachel E. & Swamy, Anand V., 1999. "The hazards of piecemeal reform: british civil courts and the credit market in colonial India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-24, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:58:y:1999:i:1:p:1-24
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    1. Hoff, Karla & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1998. "Moneylenders and bankers: price-increasing subsidies in a monopolistically competitive market," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 485-518, April.
    2. Cohn, Bernard S., 1961. "From Indian Status to British Contract," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(04), pages 613-628, December.
    3. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 1995. "The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(2), pages 407-443.
    4. Basu, Kaushik, 1984. "Implicit Interest Rates, Usury and Isolation in Backward Agriculture," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 145-159, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2010. "Only Twice as Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 775-803, July.
    2. Guha, Brishti & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2013. "Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 86-102.
    3. Sergio Navajas & Jonathan Conning & Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, 2003. "Lending technologies, competition and consolidation in the market for microfinance in Bolivia," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(6), pages 747-770.
    4. Tanika Chakraborty & Anirban Mukherjee & Sarani Saha, 2015. "Court-ship, kinship and business: a study on the interaction between the formal and the informal institutions and its effect on entrepreneurship," IZA Journal of Labor & Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 4(1), pages 1-21, December.
    5. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Nagarajan, Hari K., 2009. "Determinants and Consequences of Land Sales Market Participation: Panel Evidence from India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 410-421, February.
    6. Conning, Jonathan & Kevane, Michael, 2002. "Why isn't there more Financial Intermediation in Developing Countries?," WIDER Working Paper Series 028, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Deininger, Klaus & Goldstein, Markus, 2014. "Environmental and gender impacts of land tenure regularization in Africa: Pilot evidence from Rwanda," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 262-275.
    8. Dhillon, Amrita & Rigolini, Jamele, 2011. "Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 79-87.
    9. Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2009. "The de Soto Effect," CEPR Discussion Papers 7259, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Bardhan, Pranab, 2005. "Law and Economics in the Tropics: Some Reflections," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 65-74, March.
    11. Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2004. "Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System," NBER Working Papers 10825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin, 2008. "Land Sales and Rental Markets in Transition: Evidence from Rural Vietnam," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 70(1), pages 67-101, February.
    13. repec:eee:exehis:v:65:y:2017:i:c:p:36-54 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Messick, Richard E, 1999. "Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 14(1), pages 117-136, February.
    15. Belloc Marianna, 2009. "Cross-Cultural Trade and Institutional Stability," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, October.
    16. Anand Swamy, 2010. "Land and Law in Colonial India," Department of Economics Working Papers 2011-01, Department of Economics, Williams College.
    17. Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Li, Larry & Naughton, Tony, 2013. "The relational underpinnings of formal contracting and the welfare consequences of legal system improvement," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 72-76.
    18. Falkowski, Jan, 2013. "Does it matter how much land your neighbour owns? The functioning of land markets in Poland from a social comparison perspective," Factor Markets Working Papers 171, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    19. Anna E. Jurczuk & Piotr Pysz, 2016. "Dokąd zmierzał system gospodarczy Polski w latach 1995–2012?," Gospodarka Narodowa, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 3, pages 5-34.
    20. Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj, 2006. "Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 398-412, April.
    21. Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2015. "Competition and Relational Contracts: Evidence from Rwanda's Coffee Mills," 2015 Meeting Papers 431, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    22. Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 2001. "Land institutions and land markets," Handbook of Agricultural Economics,in: B. L. Gardner & G. C. Rausser (ed.), Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 288-331 Elsevier.
    23. Ogus, Anthony, 2004. "The Importance of Legal Infrastructure for Regulation (and Deregulation) in Developing Countries," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30603, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    24. Bose, Niloy & Murshid, Antu Panini & Wurm, Martin A., 2012. "The Growth Effects of Property Rights: The Role of Finance," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1784-1797.
    25. Anthony Carilli & Christopher Coyne & Peter Leeson, 2008. "Government intervention and the structure of social capital," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 21(2), pages 209-218, September.

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