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Political favoritism by powerful politicians: Evidence from chief ministers in India

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  • Khalil, Umair
  • Oak, Mandar
  • Ponnusamy, Sundar

Abstract

We study whether in single-member-district legislative systems, powerful politicians engage in political favoritism towards their constituents. The focus is on the chief ministers of Indian state governments. Using night light intensity as a measure of economic activity, we find that a constituency represented by a sitting chief minister exhibits about 13 percentage increase in luminosity relative to all other constituencies. The effect comes predominantly from the cases where the chief minister's constituency lies outside their birth region. Neighboring constituencies, particularly those with strategic political value, also benefit from this windfall, suggesting the mechanism at play is likely to be political expediency rather than in-group favoritism.

Suggested Citation

  • Khalil, Umair & Oak, Mandar & Ponnusamy, Sundar, 2021. "Political favoritism by powerful politicians: Evidence from chief ministers in India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:66:y:2021:i:c:s0176268020300975
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101949
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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Qijun, 2025. "Local connectivity and corruption: Micro evidence from China," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    2. Yuan Li & Chuanjiang Yu & Yue Luo & Xinju He, 2024. "The higher‐ranking local officials and local economic growth: Evidence from China," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), September.
    3. Sundar Ponnusamy & Marco Faravelli, 2023. "Terrorism and Local Economic Development," Discussion Papers Series 664, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    4. Makkar, Karan, 2023. "Defector Politicians and Economic Growth: Evidence from India," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. Asatryan, Zareh & Baskaran, Thushyanthan & Birkholz, Carlo & Hufschmidt, Patrick, 2023. "Favoritism by the governing elite," Ruhr Economic Papers 1029, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    6. Zaman, Rafia & Borsky, Stefan, 2025. "Solar power play: Uncovering political capture in distributing electricity access," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    7. Gianluca Cerruti, 2024. "Politics and city growth in Italy: Do connections matter?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 415-485, December.
    8. Cheng, Hui-Pei & Swee, Eik Leong, 2024. "Farewell President! Political favoritism, economic inequality, and political polarization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    9. Ponnusamy, Sundar & Trinh, Trong-Anh, 2025. "The impact of mobile internet on student cognitive performance during COVID: Evidence from Pakistan," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    10. Mattos, Enlinson & Politi, Ricardo & Morata, Rodrigo, 2021. "Birthplace favoritism and the distribution of budget amendments in Brazil: Evidence from nondistrict elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes

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