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Solar power play: Uncovering political capture in distributing electricity access

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  • Zaman, Rafia
  • Borsky, Stefan

Abstract

This study investigates the impact of elected politicians geographical representation on distributive decisions in a solar energy safety net program in Northern Bangladesh. Using a unique dataset on solar home system installations and political leaders’ biographies, we find strong evidence of political capture in the form of birthplace favoritism, leading to an uneven distribution of solar home systems among villages. Heterogeneous voting power within a rural council further amplifies political capture at the local level. Moreover, the extent of political capture varies based on the form of representation, power status of elected leaders, and intended beneficiaries. Finally, our results highlight that the programs effectiveness in expanding electricity access is adversely affected by the prevailing political capture within the program.

Suggested Citation

  • Zaman, Rafia & Borsky, Stefan, 2025. "Solar power play: Uncovering political capture in distributing electricity access," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:193:y:2025:i:c:s0305750x25001044
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2025.107019
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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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