Only Twice as Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders
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Other versions of this item:
- Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2007. "Only Twice As Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Center for Development Economics 2007-03, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Mandar Oak & Anand Swamy, 2007. "Only Twice As Much: A Rule for Regulating Lenders," Department of Economics Working Papers 2007-06, Department of Economics, Williams College.
References listed on IDEAS
- Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla, 1999. "Banking (Conservatively) with Optimists," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 324-350, Summer.
- Kranton, Rachel E. & Swamy, Anand V., 1999. "The hazards of piecemeal reform: british civil courts and the credit market in colonial India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-24, February.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
- Manove, M. & Padilla, A.J. & Pagano, M., 1998.
"Collateral vs. Project Screening: a Model of Lazy Banks,"
9807, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Y Financieros-.
- Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Manove, Michael & Padilla, Atilano Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model Of Lazy Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 2439, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carter, Michael R., 1988. "Equilibrium credit rationing of small farm agriculture," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 83-103, February.
- Manove, Michael & Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2001. "Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 726-744, Winter.
- Dercon, Stefan (ed.), 2004. "Insurance Against Poverty," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199276837.
More about this item
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
- N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
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